stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

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Strict stationary subgame-perfect equilibria:[6] An outcome is attainable in strict-stationary-subgame-perfect-equilibrium, if for every player the outcome is strictly better than the player's minimax outcome (note that this is not an "if-and-only-if" result). To achieve subgame-perfect equilibrium with the overtaking criterion, it is required to punish not only the player that deviates from the agreement path, but also every player that does not cooperate in punishing the deviant.[7]: 149–150 

The "stationary equilibrium" concept can be generalized to a "periodic equilibrium", in which a finite number of outcomes is repeated periodically, and the payoff in a period is the arithmetic mean of the payoffs in the outcomes. That mean payoff should be strictly above the minimax payoff.[6]